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EFFECTS OF RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS:  CAN THEY INCLUDE HIGHER LEVELS OF 
SATISFACTION FOR UNION WORKERS? 
 
Steven Lance Popejoy, University of Central Missouri 
 
This paper reviews theories and evidence on the effect of “right-to-work” laws on union members’ satisfaction with their 
unions.  With the increase of right-to-work activity at the state level, and with federal right-to-work legislation pending in 
Congress, this has returned as an important political issue.  Following a brief review of how the hypotheses of “taste,” 
“free-rider,” and “bargaining power” can influence various effects of right-to-work laws, the idea of utility maximization 
paired with measures of union satisfaction is explored to show theoretical evidence that greater levels of union 
satisfaction could exist in right-to-work states than exist in non-right-to-work states.  Arguments for both positive and 
negative effects are compared.  The author proposes that, as a future area of research, empirical tests be performed that 
combine the concept of simultaneous equations with recently developed measures of union satisfaction.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since passage of the initial right-to-work (RTW) law by 
the State of Florida in 1943, followed subsequently by 
validating federal legislation as part of the Taft-Hartley Act 
of 1947 (29 U.S.C. Sections 141 et seq.), much controversy 
has been generated over the effects of such a law on the 
union movement.  Twenty-three states presently have such 
legislation in one form or another (see Table 1), including 
Indiana, whose law applies only to school employees (Neal, 
2010), and numerous studies have been performed to 
determine whether RTW laws have acted as a help or a 
hindrance to various aspects of unionism.  Inquiry into the 
effects of RTW legislation has touched areas as diverse as 
membership levels, union services, strikes, union militancy, 
and wage levels (for a comprehensive review of right-to-
work and its effects, see Moore, 1998, and Moore and 
Newman, 1985).  However, no study has investigated its 
relationship to union satisfaction:  Specifically, are union 
members in a right-to-work state more, or less, satisfied with 
the performance of their union than union members in a non-
right-to-work state? 
Over the past several decades, studies on union 
satisfaction have produced few significant results.  However, 
research by Fiorito, Gallagher and Fukami (1988) provides a 
viable framework for analyzing union satisfaction, and in 
this study an attempt is made to apply its underlying theory 
to the right-to-work controversy.  A current view shared by 
many in organized labor is that RTW laws are detrimental to 
the union movement.  By not requiring all members of a 
bargaining unit to join the union, an erosion of solidarity and 
bargaining power occurs.  Additionally, the existence of 
“free riders” in the system is generally thought to increase 
the organizing and maintenance costs of the union.  Taking 
all of this into consideration, is it possible that union 
members could still be more satisfied with their union’s 
performance in a right-to-work state than in its “union-
friendly” counterpart?  Contemporary theory seems to 
indicate that the answer may be yes. 
 
This paper attempts to show from a theoretical 
perspective how this scenario would likely occur, as well as 
present a balanced view of the relevant arguments, both pro 
and con.  Through analysis of various hypotheses, it is hoped 
that an increased understanding of RTW laws in general, and 
union satisfaction in particular, will result. 
 
BACKGROUND ON THE RIGHT-TO-WORK 
DEBATE 
 
Prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act (also known 
as the Labor Management Relations Act), employers and 
unions could lawfully agree to various forms of union 
security.  A union security agreement is essentially a 
provision of the union contract that describes the obligations 
of the employees to support the union.  Throughout labor’s 
history, these agreements have been highly valued by 
organized labor and effectively despised by employers.  To a 
degree, they represent a tool of preservation to unions, and 
typically have existed in the following forms: 
 
1. Closed Shop – Makes union membership a 
pre-condition of hiring, and continued 
employment subject to retaining that 
membership.  
2. Union Shop – Allows non-members to be 
hired as long as they become members within 
a specified time frame, usually 30 or 60 days. 
3. Preferential Shop (or Union Shop with 
Preferential Hiring) – Specifies that union 
members be given precedence over other 
applicants for job vacancies.  In some 
occupations, such as longshore, shipping and 
construction, where job assignments are 
allocated through a hiring hall, preferential 
hiring may amount to a closed shop. 
4. Agency Shop – Allows non-members to be 
hired without joining the union as long as he 
or she pays the equivalent of initiation fees and 
periodic dues. 
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5. Maintenance of Membership – Requires that 
all employees whose dues are being deducted 
from earnings at the time the agreement takes 
effect shall continue to have dues deducted for 
the duration of the agreement and that dues 
shall be deducted from the earnings of all 
employees who are hired on or after the 
effective date of the agreement (Hansen, 
Jackson and Miller, 1982:  122). 
 
TABLE 1 
 
State Right-to-Work Laws, as of January 1, 2010 
 
 
STATE 
YEAR CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT ADOPTED 
YEAR STATUTE ENACTED 
Alabama  1953 
Arizona 1946 1947 
Arkansas 1944 1947 
Florida 1944 1943 
Georgia  1947 
Idaho  1985 
Indiana   1956-1965 (repealed) 
1995 (school employees) 
Iowa  1947 
Kansas 1958 1975 
Louisiana  1976 
Mississippi 1960 1954 
Nebraska 1946 1947 
Nevada 1952 1951 
North Carolina  1947 
North Dakota 1948 1947 
Oklahoma 2001 2001 
South Carolina  1954 
South Dakota 1946 1947 
Tennessee  1947 
Texas  1993 
Utah  1955 
Virginia  1947 
Wyoming  1963 
Source:  Employment Standards Administration/U.S. Department of Labor 
 
Of course, the absence of any form of union security 
agreement is referred to as an “open shop,” signifying that 
any worker is eligible for hire, whether a union member or 
not.  (The terms “closed shop” and “open shop” were coined 
by the National Association of Manufacturers during its 
1903 convention, to differentiate among employers who 
“closed off” hiring to only union members, and those who 
“opened up” the hiring process to all workers.  The open 
shop was an important plank in its labor platform during the 
coming election year (Shott, 1956:  12).) 
It is the ideology behind the union security agreement 
that is at the heart of the right-to-work debate.  How much 
authority does the federal government grant to unions that 
would allow them to compel membership?  Under Taft-
Hartley, Congress outlawed in its entirety the closed shop 
form of union security.  However, the union shop and other 
derivative forms are sanctioned in sections 8(a)(3) and 
8(b)(2), subject to clearly defined specifications (Keller, 
1956:17).  The controversy over right-to-work stems from 
section 14(b), which expressly affirms the right of each state 
(and/or territory) to prohibit compulsory unionism (and thus 
create the right to work): 
 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as 
authorizing the execution or application of 
agreements requiring membership in a labor 
organization as a condition of employment in any 
State or Territory in which such execution or 
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law 
(29 U.S.C. Section 164). 
 
Thus, in states where some form of right-to-work has 
been passed, section 14(b) allows state law to control over 
federal law regarding sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2), and 
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compulsory unionism will be banned to the degree specified 
by state law.  In actuality, section 14(b) merely validates 
judicial construction of the National Labor Relations 
(Wagner) Act (29 U.S.C. Sections 151 et seq.).  The U. S. 
Supreme Court had long held prior to 1947 that sections 8(3) 
and 10(a) permitted the states to declare compulsory union 
agreements invalid; section 14(b) simply restated this 
principle as statutory law (Keller, 1956:18). 
As one might expect, the union movement has never 
embraced the concept of 14(b).  Many in the union camp 
called right-to-work laws a “campaign for the weakening of 
trade unions” (Shott, 1956:  1).  Other comments referred to 
RTW as “part of an overall anti-union package” (American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, 1958:  27), a “device which can be used to 
harass unions” (AFL and CIO:  37), and “the handiwork of 
reactionary employers….” (United Steelworkers of America, 
1958:  7).  As suggested by these comments, the debate is an 
emotional one.  While proponents of right-to-work speak in 
terms of freedom of choice and freedom of association, 
unions counter with the “free-rider” problem:  The inherent 
unfairness of allowing non-members to receive the benefits 
of union membership without having to join the union, at the 
expense of their fellow workers who do belong to the union. 
This problem arises in a right-to-work state where the 
open shop controls.  Workers will be hired and, in a 
unionized workplace, will decide on whether to join the 
union.  Under federal law (the Wagner Act), the union will 
be the exclusive bargaining agent for the entire bargaining 
unit, members and non-members alike.  Whatever union 
wages and benefits are negotiated for the bargaining unit 
will apply to all employees.  Those who do not join the 
union will receive the same benefits as those who do, even 
though they pay no initiation fees or dues. 
Unions firmly believe that all employees should pay a 
proportionate share of the union’s costs in negotiating 
benefits that will be received by all, and those who don’t pay 
are shirking their responsibilities.  The emotion of the issue 
is reflected in a United Steelworkers of America booklet, 
which pointed out that free riders “may be said to indulge in 
a working class variety of tax dodging” (United 
Steelworkers of America, 1958:  28, quoting Myers, 1943). 
Following the passage of Taft-Hartley in 1947, a flurry 
of activity occurred as states acted on section 14(b), creating 
right-to-work status through either statutory enactment or 
constitutional amendment, or both.  Currently all of the 
states in the Deep South and a number of states in the 
Midwest, Rocky Mountain and Plains areas have right-to-
work laws, while the typically pro-union Northeastern 
region has none.  While activity in the right-to-work arena 
was minimal during the 1990s, the previous decade has 
brought the topic back to the forefront of the labor 
movement.  Oklahoma joined the ranks of RTW states in 
2001, the first state to enact such legislation since Texas in 
1993.  Both the Oklahoma statute and constitutional 
amendment (also enacted in 2001) were immediately 
challenged by local labor unions, with the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court upholding both laws in December of 2003 
(National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, 2004).  
The judicial support of the RTW laws created momentum in 
other parts of the country, including Pennsylvania, Indiana, 
Missouri and Michigan.  Currently, right-to-work legislation 
has been proposed in 2010 in Indiana (House Bill 1011), 
where right-to-work had been repealed in 1965 following 
nine years of coverage (Bauer, 2010).  In Pennsylvania, 
several bills (including House Bill 50) dealing with right-to-
work were proposed in 2009, and are currently being 
considered by the House Committee on Labor Relations 
(Deyo, 2010; Boehm, 2010).  It is important to note that 
much of the current state activity is being conducted in the 
pro-union northeastern region of the United States, where 
RTW legislation has been rare.  Conversely, it is interesting 
to note that in Colorado, where the Rocky Mountain region 
has been friendlier to RTW proponents, a right-to-work 
proposal was soundly defeated in 2008 (Rosa, 2008).  
While right-to-work activity has predominantly been at 
the state level throughout its history, there is current interest 
at the national level (National Right to Work Committee, 
2010).  House Bill H.R. 4107, the National Right-to-Work 
Act, was introduced in Congress in November of 2009, and 
at present has been referred to a House Subcommittee for 
consideration.  The NRTWA would amend both the National 
Labor Relations (Wagner) Act and the Railway Labor Act 
by repealing those provisions that permit employers to 
require employees to join a union as a condition of 
employment.  If passed, this would represent the first 
significant changes to U.S. labor law in over fifty years. 
 
EFFECTS OF RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS 
 
Research involving right-to-work laws and their 
implications for unionization has become increasingly 
sophisticated over the years.  Early studies involving the 
RTW issue were primarily theoretical or impressionistic in 
nature and evoked widely varying opinions.  Inquiry by 
Meyers (1955) reached the conclusion that a right-to-work 
statute was purely symbolic in nature, and created minimal 
effect upon the extent of unionization (see also Kuhlman, 
1955; Witney, 1958). 
That claim was rebutted by Kuhn (1961), who surmised 
that RTW laws created a substantial obstruction to union 
growth and strength, but could find no tangible evidence 
(1961:  594).  Glasgow (1967), in turn, pointed out that the 
bulk of evidence suggests that unions existing in an RTW 
state should experience a significant decrease in 
membership, as well as a decline in union income and an 
increase in per-member union service costs. 
In the mid-1970’s, the controversy developed an 
empirical nature, encompassing debate not only as to the 
effects of RTW laws, but also to the analytical procedures 
used.  Research tended to focus on the consequences of 
RTW laws in areas such as membership levels, wages, the 
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union-nonunion wage differential, union militancy, strikes, 
and organizing success.  The first three items are of 
particular importance to this study, which is loosely based 
on the concept of demand and supply of union services. 
 
Membership Level Effects 
 
In the initial studies regarding the effects of RTW laws 
on union membership levels, empirical models often utilized 
demand and supply analysis, relating membership levels to 
various independent variables that should influence the 
demand for  (Ud) or supply of (Us) union services (see 
Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 1969; Pencavel, 1971; see also 
Moore and Newman, 1985).  As an example:  
 
Ud = Ud (p, w, d, np, t) 
Us = Us (p, c, g) 
 
Where, 
p = Price of membership 
w = Wage rate (proxy for wealth) 
d = Union/nonunion wage differential 
np = Nonpecuniary union benefits (e.g., risk of 
accident) 
t = Tastes and preferences 
c = Costs of organizing/providing services 
g = Goals of the union (e.g., maximizing income, 
maximizing membership levels) 
  
The extent of unionism (U) will be determined by finding 
the equilibrium between the demand for and the supply of 
union services: 
 
U = Ud = Us 
 
In using such a model (which assumes an RTW variable 
to be exogenous to the system), Lumsden and Peterson 
(1975) concluded that although a right-to-work state 
typically had a smaller percentage of the work force 
unionized, this was due to the tastes and preferences of the 
population, and not an effect of the RTW law.  The so-called 
“taste hypothesis” suggests that RTW laws do not have an 
independent effect on Ud, Us, or U, but simply represent 
underlying hostile attitudes, which are responsible for any 
decrease in the equilibrium level of unionism.  Right-to-
work status is essentially symbolic in nature, and generally 
is found only in states where anti-union sentiment exists. 
Similar results (i.e., a negative correlation between 
union membership and RTW status) have been obtained in 
other studies, but the interpretation of such results has 
varied.  Moore and Newman (1975), Wessels (1981) and 
Farber (1984) agreed with the Lumsden-Peterson conclusion 
that the effects of the RTW laws appear to be insignificant, 
essentially a reflection for the “tastes” of unionism, but 
Warren and Strauss (1979) perceived the negative 
correlation to indicate that a significant effect upon 
membership does indeed exist.  Their reasoning suggests 
that RTW laws create a free-rider problem (thus the “free-
rider hypothesis”) by allowing nonunion members to avail 
themselves of union services, thereby increasing union 
organizing and maintenance costs.  Such an increase 
(reflected in the equation through the cost variable) would 
have the effect of restraining the supply of union services, 
thus decreasing the equilibrium level of unionism (see also 
Zax and Ichniowski, 1991; Chaison and Dhavale, 1992; 
Davis and Huston, 1993; and Sobel, 1995, for further 
support of the free-rider hypothesis). 
The inconsistency in the interpretation of the above 
finding was addressed by Wessels (1981), Farber (1984), 
and Moore and Newman (1985) as a flaw in the single 
equation model.  Citing research by Palomba and Palomba 
(1971), Moore and Newman pointed out that bias exists in 
the form of reverse causality:  The extent of unionism is as 
likely to be a factor in the passage of an RTW law as an 
RTW law is likely to affect the extent of unionism (see also 
Moore, Newman and Thomas, 1974).  Put another way, 
highly unionized states are less likely to pass right-to-work 
legislation than lightly-unionized states.  To compensate for 
such bias, it is necessary to estimate a simultaneous 
equations model that includes both union membership and 
RTW status as endogenous variables. 
Where such an adjustment has been made, the RTW 
variable generally will no longer have a significant effect 
upon union membership (Moore and Newman, 1985; Farber, 
1984; and Wessels, 1981).  However, it is interesting to note 
that even with simultaneous equations, Warren and Strauss 
(1979) still obtained a significant effect in the relationship. 
A third explanation, the “bargaining power hypothesis,” 
suggests that by preventing unions from requiring universal 
membership, RTW laws directly weaken the bargaining 
power of unions (Moore and Newman, 1985:  574-575).  In 
other words, diminished bargaining power leads to 
diminished benefits; diminished benefits dampen workers’ 
attraction to unionism, thereby decreasing the equilibrium 
level of unionism (with the RTW effect evident in the union-
nonunion wage differential). 
The three hypotheses outlined above reflect the 
complexity of right-to-work issue (see, e.g., Moore, 1998:  
449-450).  Under the taste hypothesis, repeal of section 
14(b) would have no significant effect on union membership 
in right-to-work states.  Under both the free-rider and 
bargaining power hypotheses, a repeal of 14(b) would lead 
to an increase in union membership, while an expansion of 
14(b) would decrease union membership (Delaney, 1998:  
429).  This is in part responsible for the wide variation in 
findings that have occurred over the past thirty years (see 
Table 2 for a comprehensive summary), and is also 
indicative of the frustration that has resulted from 
unanswered questions. 
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TABLE 2 
 
Effect of Right-to-Work Laws on Membership 
 
STUDY EFFECT OF RTW LAW RATIONALE 
Lumsden & Peterson, 
1975 
No Effect Taste Hypothesis makes 
RTW symbolic 
Moore & Newman, 1975 No Effect Taste Hypothesis makes 
RTW symbolic 
Wessels, 1981 No Effect Taste Hypothesis makes 
RTW symbolic 
Farber, 1984 No Effect Taste Hypothesis makes 
RTW symbolic 
Warren & Strauss, 1979 Negative Effect Due to Free Rider 
Hypothesis 
Moore & Newman, 1985 Negative Effect Due to Bargaining Power 
Hypothesis 
 
Wage Effects 
 
Similar analyses, utilizing the various hypotheses, have 
been applied to test other RTW effects, such as the 
relationship between RTW laws and union wages; 
significance generally depends upon whether the RTW 
variable is treated endogenously or exogenously.  Using an 
exogenous interpretation, Carroll (1983) found that RTW 
status had a significant negative effect upon union wages, 
attributing it to a lower equilibrium level of unionization and 
subsequent weaker union bargaining power (bargaining 
power hypothesis).  Moore (1980) similarly treated RTW 
status exogenously, but upon finding union wages to be 
lower in a right-to-work state, qualified his conclusion by 
noting that reverse causality could be present (i.e., states 
with less unionization and thus lower wages may be more 
likely to pass RTW legislation).  Wessels (1981), in using 
both exogenous and endogenous treatments, found RTW 
status to cause wages to be significantly lower in the former 
model, and yet lose its influence on wages in the latter 
model.  Other research of note in this area would include 
Farber, 1984 (both taste and free-rider hypotheses led to 
union wage premiums in RTW states); Garofalo and 
Malhotra, 1992 (RTW laws had a large, significant, negative 
effect on average wages, due to productivity effects); 
Hundley, 1993 (no significant effect on union nor nonunion 
wages in the public sector); Mishel, 2001 (average wages 
were 6-8 percent lower in a RTW state); and Kendrick, 
2001, Reed, 2003, and Greer, 2004 (wages tended to be 
significantly higher in an RTW state).  As previously noted, 
theory is mixed as to how RTW laws affect wages (see 
Table 3 for a comprehensive summary).  A general 
conclusion is that RTW laws have no lasting impact on 
union wages, nonunion wages, or average wages in either 
the public sector or the private sector (Moore, 1998). 
 
Wage Premium Effects 
 
Regarding the union-nonunion wage differential, 
research has seemed to indicate a positive relationship 
between RTW status and the union wage premium.  Farber 
(1984) found the premium to be higher in right-to-work 
states, basing his analysis upon both the free-rider 
hypothesis and the taste hypothesis.  Under the former, the 
presence of free riders constrains the supply of union jobs, 
creating a higher equilibrium price of unionization and a 
lower equilibrium extent of unionization.  This in turn raises 
the equilibrium level of unionization advantage, and 
increases the wage premium to the extent that it can be 
measured by the union-nonunion wage differential.  Under 
the taste hypothesis, a decreased perception of union benefits 
constrains demand for union representation, while the 
relative supply of union jobs remains stable.  Such a 
scenario, complete with lower equilibrium levels of price 
and amount of unionization, implies that for those 
employees who do join a union, there must be pecuniary 
advantages sufficient to outweigh nonpecuniary 
disadvantages, and to the extent this difference can be 
measured by a union wage premium, such premium will be 
greater in an RTW state.  In addition to Farber, Moore 
(1980) also studied wage premium effects with much the 
same results. 
 
5
Popejoy: Effects of Right-To-Work Laws: Can They Include Higher Levels of
Published by FHSU Scholars Repository, 2010
Popejoy Journal of Business & Leadership: Research, Practice and Teaching 
 2010, Vol. 6, 89-98 
94 
TABLE 3 
 
Effect of Right-to-Work Laws on Wages 
 
STUDY EFFECT OF RTW LAW ANALYSIS 
Carroll, 1983 Negative Effect Based on Bargaining 
Power Hypothesis 
Moore, 1980 Negative Effect Possibly affected by 
reverse causality 
Wessels, 1981 Negative Effect (as 
exogenous)/No Effect (as 
endogenous) 
Used a measure of job 
satisfaction 
Farber, 1984 Positive Effect Based on Taste and Free-
Rider Hypotheses 
Garofalo & Malhotra, 
1992 
Negative Effect Based on Free-Rider 
Hypothesis 
Hundley, 1993 No Effect Focused only on public 
sector  
Mishel, 2001 Negative Effect Findings dependent on 
model used 
Kendrick, 2001 Positive Effect Affected by higher taxes in 
non-RTW states 
Reed, 2003 Positive Effect Controls for state 
economic conditions 
Greer, 2004 Positive Effect n/a 
 
Miscellaneous Effects 
 
The idea of providing a more valuable service to 
convert and hold free riders is developed by Bennett and 
Johnson (1980), who base a unique theoretical analysis upon 
property rights:  Both union “owners” (union members) and 
union “managers” (union officers) are assumed to maximize 
utility, thereby providing better and more efficient service to 
the individual worker in an RTW state than that provided in 
a non-RTW state, where the level of utility remains constant 
relative to the actions of the two parties.  Reid and Faith 
(1987) further the concept with their conclusion that unions 
in RTW states reward members more currently and more 
equally at the expense of seniority (which typically is a 
stronger basis for rewards in a non-RTW state).  This is done 
to counter members’ dissatisfaction which could otherwise 
be cured by disaffiliation from the union.  Both studies 
coincide with Galloway’s theory (1966) that unions have to 
“sell’ their services more so in an RTW state than in a non-
RTW state due to the fact that the workers are not required 
to join the union.  In doing so, they make the offer to join 
more attractive by trading off employment gains for higher 
wage demands. 
The studies involving the concept of utility 
maximization have important implications for research on 
the concept of union satisfaction.  The implication that 
unions must constantly sell themselves in order to counter 
the readily available “exit” option also implies that they 
must be more responsive to “voice.” (For a comprehensive 
view of exit and voice, see Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  
The implementation of the utility maximization concept may 
prevent oligarchical union tendencies that may exist in the 
non-RTW setting and enhance what Crouch terms 
“representational rationality” (1982:  170).  Where it is 
necessary for unions to utilize extra “effort” to attract and 
retain members, as seems to be the case in RTW states, a 
reasonable expectation is a higher level of union member 
satisfaction with their unions when compared to their 
counterparts in non-RTW states.  By analyzing the principal 
determining factors of union satisfaction, an attempt will be 
made to examine the dependency of union satisfaction upon 
the existence of a right-to-work law. 
 
MEASUREMENT OF UNION SATISFACTION 
 
The concept of union satisfaction has been dealt with 
empirically in relatively few instances.  An extensive study 
by Glick, Mirvis and Harder (1977) investigated the 
satisfaction of unionized engineers by correlating six 
categories of independent measures with a multiple-item 
index of overall union satisfaction.  The effort found a 
relationship between union satisfaction and member 
assessment of the quality of the union’s relationship with its 
members, as well as member perceptions of the union 
leader’s ability to deal with management. 
A subsequent study by Fiorito, Gallagher and Fukami 
(1988) focused on the concept of satisfaction as a function of 
discrepancies between expectations and perceived outcomes, 
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an approach that serves as the basis of much research in the 
field of job satisfaction.  Using a model based on overall 
union satisfaction and its connection to the above-mentioned 
discrepancies in the facets of bread-and-butter issues, 
member-union relations issues, and quality of work issues, a 
statistically significant relationship was found for the first 
two items.  The quality of work facet proved to be of little 
importance. 
A study along similar lines by Jarley, Kuruvilla and 
Casteel (1990) and later replicated to a degree by Kuruvilla 
and Frenkel (1997) and Frenkel and Kuruvilla (1999) 
eschewed a facet discrepancy model of overall union 
satisfaction in favor of an instrument which directly 
measured satisfaction with union representation in various 
areas, to be used as a predictor of the overall level of 
satisfaction.  In addition to the three areas studied by Fiorito 
et al., a fourth area entitled General Attitude Toward Unions 
was utilized (based on a supplemental finding in the Fiorito 
et al. study).  Results of the study largely paralleled the 
findings of Fiorito et al., with the exception that quality of 
work life proved to be significant in one of the two samples 
observed.  In both studies, member-union relations proved to 
exhibit the greatest effect on overall union satisfaction. 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR A POSITIVE RTW LAW EFFECT 
ON UNION SATISFACTION 
 
The results of research on the effects of RTW laws, as 
well as research on the measurement of union satisfaction, 
seem to suggest a potential relationship between the 
existence of an RTW law in a given state and the level of 
union satisfaction held by the union workers of that state.  
Several arguments have been formulated to support this 
proposition.  First, one may deliberate the importance of 
utility maximization in this scenario.  Freedom of choice in 
how a worker spends his money is generally associated with 
greater utility.  Traditional economic theory suggests that a 
worker will consume union services to the point of 
optimization, a level which is determined by his or her 
assessment of the pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits 
received per dollar of dues.  This situation is found in an 
RTW state where, as evidenced by the existence of the free 
rider, a worker can make a decision to join a union based 
upon how beneficial it will be for him to do so.  However, in 
a non-RTW state and with a union shop clause, a worker has 
no such choice.  In this employment, 
    
…the coerced payment of dues lowers the 
discretionary income of the member and, when this 
occurs, the maximum level of utility or satisfaction 
attained by the member is always less than or, at 
best, equal to the maximum level of satisfaction 
attainable when the worker is not coerced to 
purchase a fixed quantity of union services.  [F]rom 
the point of view of individual satisfaction, the 
bargaining unit member is always better-off or at 
least as well-off in a right-to-work state where 
freedom of individual  choice exists than in a non-
right-to-work state where it does not (Bennett and 
Johnson, 1980). 
 
A second argument focuses on the quality of 
representation provided by unions.  Basing the analysis once 
again on utility maximization, it is noted that a union 
officer’s pecuniary benefits are fixed, being dependent upon 
the number of members in the bargaining unit.  In a non-
RTW state, an increase in this number (as well as an 
increase in the union officer’s pecuniary benefits) can only 
occur through an increase in the size of the bargaining unit, a 
variable that the officer does not control.  However, Bennett 
and Johnson (1980) note that a degree of discretion exists 
over an officer’s nonpecuniary benefits (defined by the 
authors as an amount paid from the difference between 
union revenues and operating costs).  An officer in this 
situation could increase his nonpecuniary benefits by 
increasing dues or decreasing operating costs (in the form of 
services provided) to an extent that remained politically 
prudent.  Such behavior would tend to result in the 
inefficient provision of union services. 
Conversely, in an RTW state (where bargaining unit 
size is not fixed), a union officer can increase his pecuniary 
and nonpecuniary benefits by inducing nonmembers to join 
the union.  This could be done by making union membership 
more attractive through either a reduction in dues or an 
increase in the services provided.  It follows that strong 
incentives exist for the union officer to keep dues low and to 
provide a wide variety of services that appeal to a diverse 
group.  Additionally, such services must be provided 
efficiently, lest increased operating costs force an increase in 
dues.  Bennett and Johnson (1980) found little empirical 
support for the first two prognoses, but did find evidence 
that operating costs were lower in RTW states. 
Finally, the union-nonunion wage differential will be 
cause for increased union satisfaction in an RTW state.  As 
mentioned previously, Farber (1984) found that under either 
the free-rider hypothesis or the taste hypothesis, the union-
nonunion wage differential appears to be greater in RTW 
states than in non-RTW states.  Such can only lead one to 
infer that, from a wage standpoint, union members in RTW 
states may be more satisfied than their non-RTW 
counterparts. 
 
COUNTERARGUMENTS 
 
Arguments exist that oppose the hypothesis of a positive 
union satisfaction-RTW law relation, primarily focusing on 
the lack of bargaining power of a union in an RTW state.  A 
primary argument made by those who oppose RTW laws is 
that weakened bargaining power results from the inability to 
require universal union membership.  As such, expected 
benefits resulting from union membership would necessarily 
7
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be lower in a RTW state, with concurrently less satisfaction 
for union members. 
A second argument, alluded to previously, is forwarded 
by Warren and Strauss (1979) and is based on the free-rider 
theory.  It is their view that the existence of free-riders in an 
RTW state, by taking advantage of union services and 
benefits, will increase the associated costs to the point that 
the supply of such services and benefits will be reduced. 
Finally, it may be argued that a trade-off exists in an 
RTW state between expending limited resources on 
bargaining for increased wages and benefits and expending 
those resources on organizing costs and other activities long 
term in nature.  By focusing on the short-term strategy of 
attracting nonunion members by negotiating higher 
compensation packages, long-term union goals may be 
sacrificed along with the long-term satisfaction of its 
members. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Right-to-work as an economic and legal issue is 
returning to relevance, as what had once been a dormant area 
of research is gradually moving back to the front page of 
politics, both state-wide and nationally.  This increasing 
relevance has implications not only from the national policy 
perspective, but also from the perspective of the human 
resource function at the organizational level.  With the 
growth of Progressive Human Resource Management 
(PHRM) over the past two decades (see, e.g., Fiorito and 
Maranto, 1987, Ichniowski, Delaney and Lewin, 1989, and 
Viswesvaran, Popejoy and Deshpande, 1992), non-union 
companies have used various tactics to develop worker 
satisfaction with the company itself.  Such tactics, including 
flexible work schedules, participative decision-making, 
information sharing, and merit-based pay systems, have had 
the dual purposes of keeping workers satisfied with their 
jobs and discrediting any perceived benefit of unionization.  
Where it can be shown that union satisfaction is higher in 
RTW states, companies must rethink the effort and emphasis 
they are placing on PHRM programs, should it be 
insufficient to counter the efforts of organized labor. 
The primary purpose of this article is to assess the 
current status of research in the area of right-to-work law 
effects, and to suggest avenues of future research.  The fact 
that arguments exist for both a positive and negative effect 
for RTW laws on union satisfaction indicate this issue is ripe 
for more rigorous methods of analysis.  As mentioned 
earlier, empirical studies are producing significant results 
and those in the field have a better understanding now of the 
relationships among the variables that have been studied 
over the past several decades.  It is felt that past successful 
approaches to RTW effects such as the use of simultaneous 
equations to reflect the inherent reverse causality may be 
married to expectancy-based behavioral satisfaction 
measures such as those described by Fiorito, Gallagher, and 
Fukami (1988) and by Jarley, Kuruvilla and Casteel (1990).  
By providing a framework for analyzing union satisfaction, 
national behavioral data bases of union studies may yield 
more definitive answers to the age-old question of how 
right-to-work laws affect the labor relations process, as well 
as the human resource function. 
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